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By Eric F. Taquechel & Marina Saitgalina

Abstract
Measuring things that do not occur, such as “deterred” or “prevented” terrorist attacks, can be
di cult. E orts to establish meaningful risk-based performance metrics and performance evaluation
frameworks based on such metrics, for government agencies with counterterrorism missions, are
arguably in a nascent state. However, by studying program theory, logic models, and performance
evaluation theory, as well as studying how risk, deterrence, and resilience concepts may be leveraged
to support antiterrorism e orts, one may propose a framework for a logic model or other
performance evaluation approach. Such a framework may integrate these concepts to help proxy
performance measurement for agencies with prevention and/or deterrence missions. This e ort
would not be without challenges.
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Introduction
Performance measurement is critical to e ective government, as it is intended to help improve public
management and program outcomes.1 Performance measurement, when properly done,
operationalizes abstract goals, speci es policies, and informs management decisions. However,
certain government functions and missions are di cult to measure.2 Speci cally, adversarial missions
such as antiterrorism and law enforcement which center on prevention and/or deterrence may make
useful performance evaluation challenging. Therefore, this essay will examine considerations for
performance evaluation frameworks that may be useful for assessing agency prevention or
deterrence missions. Intended audiences of this research include program managers, performance
analysts, policy evaluators, budget analysts, and Congressional budget oversight committees.

Context
Risk management is a critical aspect of CIKR (critical infrastructure/key resources) protection e orts
for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Risk management may encompass e orts to deter
attacks thus reducing threat, protect CIKR thus reducing vulnerability, and increase CIKR resilience

thereby reducing consequence. It may also entail simultaneous execution of such e orts. Threat is the
likelihood that an attack occurs, and that likelihood includes attacker intent and attacker capability,
estimated as probabilities.3 Vulnerability is the likelihood an attack is successful given that it is
attempted4. Consequence is the e ects of an attack.5
Together, these three elements—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—can be combined to form a
quantitative approximation of terrorist attack risk. Since performance metrics are also critical to
e ective government,6 the status of e orts to create meaningful performance evaluation systems for
antiterrorism programs that speci cally leverage risk metrics warrants review.

Importance
The New Public Management (NPM) framework of public administration focuses on outcomes instead
of inputs and processes.7 This focus has been rea rmed in the context of exploration of homeland
security performance metrics. For example, some analysts claim that outcome-oriented performance
management has increasingly supplanted output and process management.8
If we believe that the outcome-oriented focus of NPM is still relevant today, despite the alternative
theoretical framework of New Public Service (NPS) which prioritizes citizen engagement and
inclusiveness (c.f. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015, p. 32), we must explore how to measure homeland
security enterprise outcomes. However, as budgets continue to be constrained, e ciency is just as
important as e ectiveness. Therefore, a more holistic approach to agency performance evaluation
should adopt measures that include resource inputs, activities, and accomplishments (outputs).
Evaluating public agency resource inputs and activities helps with budgeting control and
accountability. As agencies make “resource input” decisions in proposed budgets, those agencies can
exercise some form of control over their programs. Control is one purpose of budgeting; it ensures
tax dollars are used to accomplish budgeted objectives.9 Historically, “object budgeting,” or the
itemization of expenditures on speci c objects, served a control purpose.10 Therefore, the budgeting
objective was to control line-item expenditures.
Also, budgeting serves a management/e ciency approach.11 After strategic priorities and objectives
are determined, budgeting helps achieve e ciencies in attaining those priorities by allocating limited
nancial resources. Thus, understanding the outputs that certain resource inputs and activities
support helps agencies manage e orts to achieve their strategic objectives more e ciently. Since
budgeting also serves a planning purpose,12 agencies must look at outcome trends to help justify outyear budgets, in support of long- term e ectiveness. Existing “planning, programming, budgeting and
execution” (PPBE) guidance may help agencies connect the dots between strategic agency priorities,
resource needs, and resource constraints. For example, DHS’ FY2006 Congressional Budget
Justi cation includes an overview of the goals of PPBE, which acknowledge scal constraints.13

Therefore, good scal management in public agency antiterrorism program administration warrants
consideration of resource inputs, activities, accomplishments, and outcomes, with appropriate
supporting metrics. Developing a theoretical framework integrating such considerations could be
useful for agencies with prevention or deterrence-oriented missions. In that spirit, exploration of
considerations for an appropriate risk-based performance measurement framework seems
appropriate, so public agencies with CIKR protection responsibilities can continuously re ne program
execution and budgeting e orts.

Research Goals
The following research questions can be posed to help shape and inform the research in support of
such a framework.
1. What is the current state of literature that might inform performance evaluation frameworks for
agencies with antiterrorism mandates, speci cally including protecting CIKR?
2. What are potential challenges to advancing performance evaluation frameworks, speci cally
with respect to incorporating risk terminology and risk theory?
Such a research e ort might explore areas of the literature including risk theory, performance
measurement theory, program evaluation theory, and law enforcement metrics. Additionally, such
e ort may bene t from a review of ideas on how to integrate concepts from risk management,
particularly deterrence, risk analysis, and resilience theory, into performance evaluation frameworks.
We propose ideas on how to integrate these concepts at the end of the essay, in an appendix.

Expected Research Bene ts
If we believe public agencies with CIKR protection responsibilities should continuously strive to
improve program execution and budgeting e orts, such agencies could bene t from conceptual
frameworks to develop and re ne risk-based performance metrics to help defend their budgets.
Research shows that motivation for using performance metrics includes assessing e ectiveness and
tracking expenditure allocation.14 Additionally, academics continue to explore ways to use
quantitative data to promote better agency e ectiveness and contain costs.15

Literature Review
Existing Literature
Performance Measurement & Logic Model Theory

McLaughlin and Jordan identify two purposes for measuring program performance: communicating
value to others/accountability, and program improvement.16 However, what are speci c ways to
facilitate these purposes? Green eld et al. discuss the theory of logic models. Logic models are
conceptual frameworks to communicate visually a simpli ed representation of a program’s activities,
outputs, customers, and outcomes to internal and external audiences, and they serve as planning
tools.17 Therefore, logic models are one framework for managing communications and program
improvement as advocated by McLaughlin and Jordan. Moreover, both McLaughlin and Jordan and
Green eld et al. o er detailed guidance to help logic- model developers ensure those models are
valuable. For instance, they recommend ensuring that if intermediate agency outcomes are achieved,
the end-state outcomes will reasonably follow.18 This speaks to establishing causation or correlation
between elements of the logic model.

Risk & CIKR Protection – Theory
There is much research in the theoretical and applied aspects of risk management for homeland
security missions. More speci cally, there is a genre of literature that deals with risk theory as applied
to CIKR protection. Taquechel and colleagues summarize some of the notable work in this literature in
addition to o ering their own insights.19
Taquechel and colleagues o er that the intent- probability component of threat can be in uenced by
agency activities that deter attacks by reducing vulnerability and/or consequence to attack, and such
deterrence e orts can be quanti ed. Furthermore, they argue that CIKR vulnerabilities to exploitation
by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or illicit materiel/personnel transfer can be modeled as logic
networks, with implications for how analysts assess vulnerability or more speci cally “exploitation
susceptibility” of such networks. Additionally, Taquechel and colleagues propose that grants might be
administered to help CIKR rebuild after an attack, but distributed as a pre-attack mitigation measure,
based on network analysis of supply- chain resilience. Other work in the areas of deterrence theory,
risk analysis, and resilience includes that of Alderson et al., Cox, Dighe et al., Kahan et al., Jenelius et
al., Lebow and Stein, Lewis, Morral and Jackson, and Vugrin et al.20
Incorporating risk theory into performance evaluation poses an opportunity to discuss deterrence
theory and adaptive adversary considerations as possible “moderator variables” in uencing the nexus
between intermediate and end-state agency outcomes. Deterrence theory is multifaceted, but it can
succinctly be described as the principle of “when an actor discourages aggression towards another
actor, with the intended outcome that the former never has to respond to aggressive action by the
latter.”21 Furthermore, adaptive adversaries are those that can change their behavior or
characteristics in response to prevention, protection, response, or recovery e orts.22 Adaptive
adversary considerations and deterrence quanti cation are important for CIKR risk analysis,23 and
Savitz et al. reinforce the idea of considering reactions of “other parties” in performance
measurement.24 Therefore, the perceived e ect of changes in adversary intent upon threat- reduction
metrics could be a valuable component of a logic model framework to integrate risk metrics with
antiterrorism program performance evaluation.

Anderson et al. claim that logic models help program managers map out “competing de nitions of the
determinants of a problem.”25 Since there are di erent theories about the underlying determinants of
risk, in particular the ongoing debate over “static”, probabilistic-based risk analysis vs the “dynamic”
game theoretical/adaptive adversary approach espoused by the operations research community (c.f.
Taquechel and Lewis, 2012, Taquechel, 2013), logic models may help visually conceptualize how both
static and dynamic probabilities of attack could in uence risk- reduction e ectiveness metrics for
various antiterrorism activities.

Program theory and “complicated interventions”
Showing causality or even correlation between prevention/deterrence-oriented homeland security
activities and ultimate risk reduction outcomes may be challenging. Rogers discusses the idea of
complicated vs. complex/emergent programs. Complicated programs are those with multiple
components, whereas “complex” programs represent programs with “recursive causality” and tipping
points.26 Therefore, logic models to describe complex programs may have inherent nonlinearities.
Furthermore, Rogers mentions that the external environment, characteristics of clients, and
overlapping programs could cause overcon dence in correlation estimates.27
In risk parlance, resilience is the “ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand,
and rapidly recover from disruption.”28 The de nition of resilience also includes system recovery.
Systems imply networks, and networks often display emergent phenomena.29 Therefore, if DHS must
defend networks of CIKR, and not just individual infrastructures, performance metrics that
incorporate resilience or consequence reduction may need to account for network-emergent
phenomena such as “self-organizing criticality”, wherein systems optimize for e ciency but possibly to
the detriment of resilience. This speaks to Rogers’ claim of external in uence on program
performance, although network-emergent phenomena often result from internal, “self-organizing”
aspects of network evolution. Nonetheless, this is a “complexity” consideration for program
evaluation. Self-organized criticality may create a tipping point.
Applying performance measurement to programs that reduce consequence and increase resilience
may be di cult. Speci cally, Henstra claims that “one of the most formidable challenges facing local
communities today is learning to apply the concepts and methods of performance measurement to
disaster preparedness.”30 Cutter et al. add to the debate over this di culty; they claim it is di cult to
measure resilience in absolute terms and proxy variables may be needed.31
Another consideration in the literature is that there are di erent types of logic models used in
program theory. For example, “pipeline” logic models show a linear progression from inputs to
activities to outputs, whereas “outcome chain” logic models may demonstrate outcomes where initial
activities were not considered, and “realist matrix” logic models may model how interventions work

di erently for di erent groups in di erent situations.32 If antiterrorism missions have inherent
nonlinearities, especially when it comes to risk modeling, performance evaluators may bene t from
di erent types of logic models.

Performance metrics in law enforcement and
antiterrorism
Law enforcement metrics may inform development of counterterrorism metrics given the common
“adversarial nature” of the two missions. Similarly, metric evaluation in law enforcement agencies can
be challenging. For example, Braga and Bond discuss e orts to assess correlation between “hot-spot”
policing activities and crime levels.33 Deterrence is another in uence upon risk metrics in law
enforcement, as it is in antiterrorism. In theory, policing preemptively may deter criminal or terrorist
activity. However, from a logic- model perspective, Brousselle and Champagne advise that logic
analysis, the evaluation of a program’s underlying theory using available scienti c knowledge, needs
to establish that the means correlate to the desired ends.34 With deterrence theory, the notion that
certain enforcement activities in uenced the adversary’s “intent” can be a theoretical exercise, without
direct evidence of causation. This can make logic-model validation di cult.
Another takeaway from Braga and Bond’s work is the importance of identifying special causal factors
in a program with multiple dimensions.35 Since risk reduction is theoretically achieved by threatreduction activities, vulnerability- reduction activities, consequence- reduction activities, or a
combination of the above, a performance-evaluation framework should allow “individual activity”
e ect isolation, as well as “simultaneously executed activity” e ect analysis. Nicholson-Crotty et al.
caution against excessive information aggregation; they claim multiple detailed measures of the same
concept are often preferable to one aggregate measure.36
However, aggregation might be valuable for di erent aspects of risk metrics. For instance, Ayyub
claims the primary basis for evaluating resilience should include both aggregate measures of systems
resilience as well as “segregated performance” of individual system components.37 If program
managers want to model the e ects of consequence-reducing activities upon residual risk (risk
remaining after those activities are performed), they might consider both segregated consequence to
individual CIKR, as well as aggregate network e ects-based consequences to a CIKR system such as
cascading failures. Keeney and Von Winterfeldt also advocate for metric aggregatibility, particularly
with respect to whether program objectives are additive or multiplicative.38 For instance, the
availability of a radiological detection device is one metric, and the device detection accuracy is
another. The two detection program objectives in this case are multiplicative rather than additive.39
Since risk analysis may be quantitative, determining whether metrics should be additive or
multiplicative may be crucial.

Additional work with logic models and risk metrics in the antiterrorism world includes evaluation of
the e ectiveness of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), a federal program to minimize
radiological and nuclear terrorism risk to the U.S. This work evaluated GDNA program goals,
objectives, and activities, the goals here being to minimize individual components of the risk equation:
threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Each goal had subordinate objectives.40 This study also
evaluated results exclusive of costs to lower these risk- equation components, instead saving those
costs for cost-e ectiveness analysis.41
Previous work on analyzing risk reduction metrics vs cost e ectiveness also separated costs from the
“utility functions” or what outcomes prospective attackers would stand to gain from successful
attacks. However, like Hilliard et al., those costs were used for return on investment analysis of
di erent government strategies to deter prospective attackers (c.f. Taquechel and Lewis, 2012;
Taquechel, Hollan, and Lewis, 2015; Taquechel and Lewis, 2016). This also speaks to the concept of
“metric aggregatibility” emphasized in other work; here it made sense to segregate cost from
performance e ectiveness metrics, but this may not always be true.

Art of the Possible?
It may be possible to address the “problem” of developing a framework for risk-based performance
evaluation in antiterrorism missions that speci cally involve CIKR protection. Creating a logic model
that incorporates activities, accomplishments and outcomes of such missions, and supporting those
logic- model elements with a variety of quantitative risk metrics, might advance solutions.
Furthermore, it may be possible to evaluate the appropriate use of risk metrics based on their value in
helping budget for an antiterrorism program, based on principles of line item/cost center
accountability, e ciency, and/or overall program e ectiveness. Moreover, such a logic model may be
able to capture the e ects of quanti able deterrence and network e ects upon risk metrics, as well as
other considerations from this literature review.

Literature Gaps
In light of the two identi ed research goals, and given this snapshot of “art of the possible”, a review of
the literature identi es the following gaps. With respect to the rst research goal, to our knowledge
the literature does not explicitly discuss a theory or model of how antiterrorism activities, outputs,
and outcomes might be organized within a performance- evaluation framework, with supporting
quantitative risk metrics, perhaps broken down by each component of the risk equation (threat,
vulnerability, consequence). Hilliard et al. (2015) speci cally discussed nuclear weapon risk in what
might be termed a “logic model” framework, but future work might be generalized to all CIKR risk.
With respect to the second research goal, the literature has gaps in several areas. First, despite the
claims of Anderson and Savitz et al. that external in uences must be accounted for and problems may
have competing interpretations, to our knowledge the literature does not speci cally explore how a

performance evaluation framework might reconcile multiple interpretations of the threat component
of the risk equation, speci cally the ongoing debate over probabilistic risk analysis vs. operations
research/game theory (c.f. Taquechel & Lewis, 2012).
Second, the literature does not speci cally discuss the challenge of how measurable adaptiveadversary in uences on risk, possibly as a recursive mechanism of action, could be incorporated into
a performance- evaluation framework. Furthermore, Taquechel and Lewis showed how deterrence
e ects of certain activities could be quanti ed and proposed how the e ects of such activities were
double-counted in revised risk equations.42 Speci cally, vulnerability- reduction activities at CIKR both
deter, thus reducing threat, and reduce vulnerability, therefore “doubly” reducing risk. However, to
our knowledge no literature has proposed how such accounting for risk reduction might inform a
performance- evaluation framework.
Third, despite Henstra’s and Cutter’s e orts to explore performance metrics in the area of resilience,
the literature does not speci cally discuss how quanti able network e ects on system resilience could
be incorporated into a performance- evaluation framework for agencies with CIKR protection
responsibilities. Fourth, despite the ongoing debate in the literature regarding metric aggregatibility
(c.f. Ayyub, Nicholson-Crotty, Braga & Bond, Keeney & Von Winterfeldt), to our knowledge the
literature does not examine how vulnerability and exploitation potential of CIKR and networks
comprised thereof, both in terms of individual and aggregate vulnerability or exploitation potential,
might be incorporated into performance- evaluation frameworks.

Recommendations and Implications –
Logic Model Framework Development
Recommendations
We recommend developing a logic- model framework that maps antiterrorism activities to outputs to
outcomes. Outputs may include attacks prevented/deterred, compliance achieved, and damage
minimized. Outcomes may entail residual risk, or risk remaining after activities are executed and
outputs (risk that was reduced) are tabulated. Furthermore, the quantitative metrics for outputs might
re ect di erent budgeting theories, for example as discussed in Hou (2006). Additionally, such a logic
model might incorporate activities and metrics that account for the nonlinear and recursive e ects of
adaptive- adversary in uence on CIKR risk, as well as the complexity of network e ects upon
vulnerability and consequence.
For instance, output metrics fashioned after the “responsibility center” or “line-item budgeting”
approach might explore threat reduced by attacks deterred. Alternatively, metrics fashioned after the
e ciency or performance-based budgeting approach might explore risk reduced, solely as a function
of those threat-reducing activities, divided by time or cost spent executing those activities. As a third

option, output metrics fashioned after “e ectiveness-based” or “rational-comprehensive” based
budgeting may explore risk reduced, as a function only of threat-reducing activities, but omitting a
cost/time denominator.
Our speculation is that activity metrics should re ect number of activities performed, and that output
metrics should re ect quanti ed risk reduced. Furthermore, we speculate that outcome metrics
should be quanti ed residual risk after activities are performed. Green eld et al. claim in a notional
logic model for a government injury-prevention program that the reduction in the incidence of sexual
violence is considered an “end outcome” metric.43 The end goal in this work seems to be minimized
“residual violence.” More generally, they claim metrics associated with annual goals typically serve as
indicators of a program’s e orts (our emphasis), whereas the intermediate and strategic goals
(equivalent to outcomes) and their associated metrics are indicative of a program’s e ect (our
emphasis).44 By that logic, antiterrorism activities might be considered e orts, whereas risk reduced
and residual risk to CIKR might be the e ects.

Implications and Constraints
Such a logic- model framework would assume that antiterrorism activities can be estimated to reduce
quantitatively elements of risk. In other words, certain activities might be estimated to reduce threat
through deterrence; other activities might be assumed to reduce vulnerability through increasing
target security and law enforcement response capabilities; and yet other activities might be assumed
to reduce consequence through response and recovery e orts.
The multiplicative e ects of speci c activities on multiple elements of the risk equation might be
accounted for in a theoretical fashion, but this could make line-item budgeting di cult. However,
activities that reduce multiple aspects of risk, e.g. through both deterring (reducing threat) and
protecting CIKR (e.g., reducing vulnerability), might be thought as of “robust activities.” Furthermore,
agency capabilities leveraged to execute those activities might be thought of as “robust capabilities,”
something that certain agencies may value even if it made activity-based or line-item budgeting
di cult. One theory is that goals, requirements, and metrics should be conceived more in terms of
“capability envelopes” rather than particular scenarios.45 However, in agencies where budgeting is
closely linked to capabilities (e.g. aircraft, boats, specialized tactical units), especially capabilities that
perform multiple missions, a logic- model approach based on activity performance and linkage to
outcomes may be challenging if one objective is to inform budget development.

Fiscal Constraints
Allocation of performance requires outcome measures; whereas budgeting decisions require
e ciency measures.46 If an agency with antiterrorism mission-execution responsibilities is resource
constrained, it may prefer only activity-based budgeting, here meaning budgeting for costs of
executing a certain number of antiterrorism activities, without regard to output or outcome.

Conversely, if an agency focuses more on performance-based budgeting, it may prefer to adjust
activity execution to reduce a certain amount of risk, or leave a certain amount of estimated residual
risk. A modeled optimization solution could maximize risk reduction given an upper- bound constraint
on resources.

Political Constraints
Some claim that outcome-based metrics are so general as to be meaningless for budgeting and
accounting purposes.47 Based on the approach proposed here, if residual risk outcome metrics are
perceived as ine cacious for supporting line- item or e ciency-based budgeting, the literature would
suggest that not even an antiterrorism program’s e ectiveness-based budgeting e ort could
realistically be supported by residual risk metrics.
As agencies develop and propose budgets in an environment where elected o cials scrutinize
agency- performance metrics, it may be di cult to justify funding based on a program-logic model
that advocates risk reduction, even if elected o cials like the principle of programs targeting
quantitative risk reduction. Accountability for performance is sometime perceived as secondary
compared to accountability for nances and for procedural fairness.48 Therefore, even if a rigorous
model linking activities to risk-reduction metrics is developed, expenditures on capability packages or
activity execution may receive more scrutiny than expenditures incurred in aggregate to achieve
stated risk reduction goals.
Another consideration is that performance standards can be derived from past performance or
performance of similar agencies.49 If politicians are not familiar with the evolving technical aspects of
quantitative risk analysis and management, they may benchmark agency performance o previous
performance or that of similar agencies, possibly to the detriment of what an agency is truly trying to
achieve.

Technological Constraints
Models that optimize performance are subject to tradeo s between rigor and simplicity. Any
modeling e ort that maps speci c activity execution to quantitative risk- reduction metrics, slicing and
dicing amongst the theoretical elements of risk (threat, vulnerability, consequence) may increase in
cost as complexity increases. Green eld et al. encourage determining correlation or causality in logic
models50; but Savitz et al. claim that some metrics for one federal agency’s antiterrorism mission
might be inherently unreliable given the paucity of real-world terrorist attacks.51

Time constraints

Some agencies require models that support certain decisions to undergo a formal Veri cation,
Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) process. Such a process could require lots of analyst e ort and
nancial support. Fortunately, model accreditation processes in some agencies may be tailored
subject to resource constraints. Furthermore, the wicked problem approach may limit model
e ectiveness, absent su cient time to develop such a model. Caudle (2005) argues that:

[t]he program logic model has one major drawback for homeland security in
that it clearly targets programs, normally within an organization’s control, as
the unit of analysis…complex program logic models would be necessary for
homeland security to re ect the interdependencies of many organizations
and programs.52
With this in mind, modeling the e ects of Rogers’ (2008) program “overlap” upon logic- model
activities and metrics might increase the time needed to construct a valuable risk metric-based logic
model for CIKR protection missions.

Conclusions
The research here suggests that e orts to establish meaningful risk-based performance evaluation
models with risk metrics for use by agencies with counterterrorism missions are in a somewhat
nascent state. However, we are optimistic that by continuing to study program theory, logic models,
and performance evaluation theory, as well as continuing to study how risk, deterrence, and resilience
concepts are leveraged to support antiterrorism e orts, academics and practitioners might esh out a
framework for a logic model or other performance- evaluation approach that integrates these
concepts to help evaluate performance for agencies with a terrorism prevention/deterrence mission.
One might conjecture that an e ort to build a performance- evaluation framework based on
quantitative risk metrics might get at the historical di erentiation between performance budgeting
and program budgeting. The former, derived from scienti c management principles, was considered a
di erent budgeting system from the latter, in uenced by economic and systems analysis.53 If program
objectives are to reduce risk and minimize residual risk, and quantitative risk reduction is a metric,
perhaps both performance and program-based budgeting are simultaneously attainable by one
agency. One might also speculate that such a framework could integrate both the input accountability
concerns and the outcome-based performance concerns that Heinrich proposes:

[a]n important question that arises for public managers and researchers is,
are outcome-based performance management systems more e ective than
traditional approaches to bureaucratic control?54

In addition to the constraints identi ed earlier, Caudle claims establishing cause and e ect
relationships to guide measurement techniques for homeland security programs is still nascent.55
With the knowledge that perfectly quanti able metrics may not be realistic, an agency can still move
forward with studying correlation between activities and risk reduction/residual risk metrics for
antiterrorism programs. Collins advocates that the public sector should not focus exclusively on
“perfectly quanti able metrics,” but should at least gather evidence of progress.56
Risk reduction is a quanti able metric, but correlating costs of assets to execute risk-reduction
activities may get at the challenge that Lewis posed in his seminal work on public budgeting. If we
subscribe to the theory of evaluating budgets based on marginal utility, maximum gain for
expenditures can only be obtained if those expenditures are distributed amongst di erent purposes
such that the last dollar spent for each purpose yields the same return.57 The concept of marginal
utility entails analysis of how alternative uses of the same increment of available resources would
yield di erent returns on investment, and prioritizing those alternative uses.58
Some agencies with antiterrorism missions may focus on control-based budgeting and track
expenditures for assets, such as boats and aircraft. If the outcomes to be achieved are risk-reduction
measures that can be sliced/diced in di erent ways, marginal utility theory may mean those agencies
can link expenditures to risk reduced through threat reduction alone, through vulnerability reduction,
through consequence reduction, or permutations of the above. This portfolio of options may have
implications for how such agencies defend their budgets, per marginal utility theory, in an incremental
budgetary environment.

Proposed Way Ahead
The next steps to continue this framework development e ort might entail the following.
1. Flesh out a notional logic model that links agency antiterrorism activities, such as port patrols
and vessel escorts, to agency accomplishments (possibly reduced risk), to agency outcomes
(possibly residual risk).
2. Hypothesize appropriate metrics for each activity, accomplishment, and outcome. Consider
direct and indirect or “proxy” metrics.
3. Assess whether those metrics might be modi ed to accommodate di erent budgeting theories
(line item/responsibility center, e ciency, e ectiveness).
4. Assess whether metrics can accommodate quanti able deterrence/adaptive adversary
considerations, network- exploitation susceptibility and other network e ects on vulnerability,
and/or network e ects on consequence and resilience.
5. Assess the “aggregatibility” and “severability” of various metrics. For example, with respect to
adaptive adversary factors, assess whether metrics derived from the concept of attacker and
defender “utility” should segregate from those metrics, or aggregate therein, costs and other
agency resource inputs to execute antiterrorism activities.

6. Assess the e ects of other organizations with similar missions upon the e cacy of certain
metrics in evaluating logic-model elements.
7. Assess whether a linear “pipeline” model, “outcome-chain”, recursive loop model, “realist”
model, or other variety of logic model is most preferable.
8. Socialize various logic model formats/details with program sponsors, budget analysts, and
agency overseers and revise models as appropriate.
9. Determine whether the preferred model would meet the threshold for formal agency
veri cation, validation, and accreditation e orts, and estimate needed resources if that
determination is in the a rmative.
Ongoing e orts to develop agency performance evaluation frameworks should be assessed as part of
this way ahead.

Appendix
Here, we show some basic logic models that broach the recommended steps in the Proposed Way
Ahead. These are not intended to be exhaustive, but instead are intended to illustrate, at a high level,
how the concepts discussed in this essay might be presented for further exploration.

Threat Reduction
Logic Model Explanation
First, we show a notional activity-accomplishment-outcome logic model for deterrence activities
(threat reduction). We show notional metrics, partitioned by the three budgeting theories: line item or
cost center, e ciency, and e ectiveness.

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Risk-Based_Performance_Metrics_ gure1.1.png)
Figure 1. Logic model, deterrence activities (threat reduction)
Key:

= threat reduced (as per deterrence activities)

= risk reduced given threat reduced, divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)

= risk reduced given threat reduced, irrespective of resource inputs

= residual threat (after deterrence activities executed)

= residual risk given threat reduced, divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)

= residual risk given threat reduced, irrespective of resource inputs

In Figure 1, activities such as stationary and moving target defenses can be measured by number of
activities performed, per resource input such as time or money, or both. The accomplishment of this
e ort is attacks deterred, with possible metrics of threat reduced (line item – tie to speci c activity or
asset performing activity), risk reduced as a function of threat per resource input (e ciency), or risk
reduced as a function of threat (e ectiveness). The outcome is residual risk, or what risk remains to
the infrastructure after deterrence activities are executed.

Analysis
Here, if risk reduction is used as an e ciency or e ectiveness metric, it could be isolated to the risk
reduced solely as a function of threat-reducing or “deterrence” activities noted. The classic risk
equation also incorporates vulnerability (V) and consequence (C) terms.

Eq. 1. Basic Risk Equation
In reality, do security activities simultaneously reduce more than one element of the risk equation?
This gets into aggregatibility/severability challenges, but speci c to threat reduction e orts, the
double-counting e ects of quanti able deterrence discussed in Taquechel and Lewis (2012) may be a
consideration in performance measurement.

Double Counting Threat Reduction
One can argue that change in threat, or attacker capability and intent to attack, is a function of
changes in target vulnerability and/or consequence.

Eq. 2. Threat as function of vulnerability, consequence

We also know that threat is derived from intent and capability:

Eq. 3. Threat as function of intent, capability
Previous work59 has proposed that intent is a function of a ratio of attacker expected utility (UeA), or
bene t from a successful attack, to the aggregate of all expected utilities from available attacker
courses of action:

Eq. 4. Intent as function of attacker expected utility
We also can surmise that attacker expected utility is a function of target vulnerability and
consequence. What a target’s defender stands to lose, an attacker stands to gain:

Eq. 5. Attacker expected utility as function of vulnerability, consequence
How does this lead to double counting? If target V or C decreases due to the target defender’s actions,
expected utility of an attack would decrease, thus decreasing intent and attacker threat. This
ultimately suggests risk reduction.

However, the e ect of vulnerability and/or consequence reduction itself should be su cient to argue
risk is reduced:

Therefore, isolating the e ects of threat reduction due to deterrence-oriented activities upon risk
reduction becomes theoretically challenging. Did the risk reduce because an adversary noticed the
point or zone defense activities and therefore had less intent to act? If so, by that logic, risk would be
mathematically reduced twice: by the lowering of threat (per Equation 3), and the lowering of
vulnerability or consequence (per Equation 1). While we can argue on a theoretical level that this
double-counting e ect of deterrence activities seems logical, from a performance metrics standpoint,
one challenge may be arguing how much risk reduction is directly attributable to activities intended to
deter, or reduce threat. Zone defense security activities seem more susceptible to this challenge, if
they do not focus security coverage on individual targets, but instead cast a wide net over a group of
targets. The e ort to reduce target vulnerability with a randomized, “zone defense” presence may be
less e ective than the e ort to reduce attacker intent to attack, and thus reduce threat. The
relationship between speci c tactical activities and metrics must be explored further.

Tracking Expenditures
The nexus between agency expenditure of time and/or money obligated to execute these deterrenceoriented activities, and the execution of the activities themselves, must be clear in order to have
defensible e ciency metrics. For instance, if the funding for assets executing deterrence activities is
earmarked speci cally for those activities, but then the asset is diverted to perform a di erent task,
the actual expenditure of those funds may trace to multiple activities in the accounting. This may
make budget planning challenging if we link strategic-mission budgeting, mission-operational
planning, and mission-execution activities.
Instead, budgeting to line-item capabilities (such as aircraft or boats) that perform multiple missions
within an agency’s portfolio may be easier, at least from a cost center/line-item budgeting perspective.
Assets are constrained by engineering-driven costs such as fuel consumption and repair cycles, which
may mean mission execution is constrained by available logistical-support funding. This may re ect
realities of budgetary and logistical constraints, and whether outcome-based budgeting is feasible,
especially in a prevention or deterrence-oriented mission, is subject to debate. This issue is
particularly relevant to deterrence-focused activities in a logic model as they may be perceived as
“generalist” in nature, not protecting any speci c target nor responding to speci c events or
actionable intelligence.

Vulnerability Reduction
Next, we show a notional activity-accomplishment-outcome logic model for Prevention/Protectionoriented activities (vulnerability reduction) with notional metrics.

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Risk-Based_Performance_Metrics_ gure2.1.png)
Figure 2. Logic model, prevention/protection activities (vulnerability reduction)
Key:
= vulnerability reduced (as per prevent/protect activities)

= risk reduced given vulnerability reduced, divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)

= risk reduced given vulnerability reduced, irrespective of resource inputs

= residual vulnerability (after prevent/protect activities executed)

= residual risk given vulnerability reduced, divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)

= residual risk given vulnerability reduced, irrespective of resource inputs

Logic Model Explanation
The rst change from Figure 1 is that a new activity is introduced: compliance inspections. These
inspections may be conducted armed or unarmed, depending on the purpose, but arguably armed
inspections might prevent or protect against an imminent attack more e ectively.
That notwithstanding, the next change is that one accomplishment is “attacks prevented” rather than
“attacks deterred.” We introduce a second objective, “compliance achieved.” Whether this is
synonymous with “attacks prevented” for logic-model analysis purposes may require additional
examination.
Then, we see the outcome is “residual vulnerability,” or the probability of a successful attack given
preventive/protective activities have been executed. The metrics for all activities, accomplishments,
and outcomes in this logic model have the same structure as those in Figure 1, but are modi ed
replacing Threat with Vulnerability.

Analysis
Aggregatibility/Severability
Since we are not focusing on the “double-counting” phenomenon here, aggregatibility and severability
takes on a di erent meaning. Previous work has explored network e ects in defending critical
infrastructure.

Network E ects- V Reduction
We now lay the foundation for a modi cation to the Figure 2 logic model. This incorporates ideas from
network analysis, with speci c reference to the type of threat addressed. Are we protecting individual
CIKR from direct attack, or from exploitation (moving illicit material through enroute to a di erent
destination)? This analysis will assume the latter.
First, we discuss some basic concepts underpinning the “exploitation susceptibility” lens through
which we will view network e ects on vulnerability and performance metrics.

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Figure_03.png)
Figure 3. Logic graph rendering of a transfer network – two ports and two vessels (Taquechel, 2010, p.
31)
A transfer network is a representation of how the terrorist-transfer threat, or movement of terrorists
or illicit material, can propagate throughout transportation nodes.60 If ports include CIKR that we
prevent or protect against attacks, this network logic could be useful in exploring appropriate
vulnerability reduction metrics for the transfer threat. Shown in expanded form, we have a notional
network where an adversary might exploit foreign ports (embark), vessels, and domestic U.S. ports
(debark), with the option to choose from multiple targets of attack:

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Figure_04.png)
Figure 4. Logic graph rendering of an expanded transfer network (Taquechel, 2010, p. 32)

If our objective is to reduce “exploitation susceptibility,” or a speci c type of vulnerability that
estimates a port facility’s likelihood of exploitation due to an adversary moving illicit goods through
undetected (rather than a direct attack against that facility), then our V metrics may take a di erent
form for logic models. Previous work allows us to propose such a functional form of exploitation
susceptibility:

Eq. 6. Network vulnerability (exploitation susceptibility), transfer network as shown in Fig 4.
Here, this network exploitation susceptibility re ects the choices the attacker can make for target
selection, and the VD1 / VD2 terms re ect a “nestled” vulnerability component that accounts for the
ease with which attackers can move materiel or people through this network.
This equation may yield a di erent value for the network’s aggregate vulnerability, or aggregate
exploitation susceptibility, than if we only consider the vulnerability of individual CIKR. We can protect
infrastructure in the two “ports of debarkation,” but if our objective is to defend against network
exploitation, our logic model metrics now take a di erent form:

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Risk-Based_Performance_Metrics_ gure5.1.png)
Figure 5.Logic model, prevention/protection activities (network exploitation)
Key:
= network exploitation susceptibility reduced (as per prevent/protect activities)

= network risk reduced given network exploitation susceptibility reduced,

divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)

= network risk reduced given network exploitation susceptibility reduced,
irrespective of resource inputs

= residual network exploitation susceptibility (after prevent/protect activities executed)

= residual network risk given network exploitation susceptibility reduced, divided

by resource input (time and/or money)

= residual network risk given network exploitation susceptibility reduced,

irrespective of resource inputs
How is residual network exploitation susceptibility expressed? We add exponential terms to Equation
6 to account for modeled investments to reduce this susceptibility, expressed probabilistically.

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Eq7.png)
Eq. 7. Network vulnerability (exploitation susceptibility), residual after investment
Importantly – the focus of the prevention/protection activities in this logic model remains the same
CIKR targets as in Figure 3 –US port infrastructure. But, there are additional in uences on the
vulnerability that those executing these activities “inherit” from upstream defensive e orts, such as
overseas compliance inspections. These in uences may be outside the scope of the logic model under
consideration.
Furthermore, the compliance inspection activity holds yet another vulnerability-reduction purpose
when the objective is speci cally to prevent or protect against exploitation via nuclear weapons
shipments. This may entail inspection of weapon-detection equipment and SOP compliance e orts.
See Taquechel, Hollan and Lewis (2015) for more discussion.

Tracking Expenditures – Issues Speci c to Vreducing Activities

One consideration for the e ciency metric denominator here is how realistic the in uence of
protective activities in U.S. ports is, when the issue at hand is exploitation susceptibility. The
vulnerability-reduction e ects of overseas compliance inspections and at-sea actions may in uence
exploitation susceptibility, and protection activities in U.S. ports may only contribute marginally to
overall network-exploitation susceptibility reduction. This may be a return on investment
consideration if the prevailing preference for performance metrics is driven by e ciency, or
accomplishment per expenditure. This gets back to the theoretical consideration of external
in uences upon performance metrics as discussed in Rogers (2008).

Consequence Reduction
Next, we show a notional activity-accomplishment-outcome logic model for resilience-oriented
activities (consequence reduction), with notional metrics.

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Risk-Based_Performance_Metrics_ gure6.1.png)
Figure 6. Logic model, resilience activities (consequence reduction)

Key:
= economic loss theoretically avoided (by resilience activities)

= CIKR lost productivity avoided given resilience activities, accounting for probability of

attack, divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)

= CIKR lost productivity avoided, irrespective of resource inputs

= residual economic productivity (after resilience activities executed)

= residual CIKR productivity, accounting for probability of attack, divided by resource

input (time and/or money)

= residual CIKR productivity, irrespective of resource inputs

Logic Model Explanation
Here, the activity is port security grants, which per previous work were proposed to take a resiliencefocused approach, providing to CIKR money speci cally earmarked for capability to rebuild to facilitate
some level of productivity after an incident. See Taquechel (2013) for more details.
The accomplishment is economic loss theoretically reduced or avoided by these resilience activities,
as lost economic productivity can be considered a consequence. Metrics entail quanti ed economic
loss (line item), or risk as a function of that economic consequence (network lost productivity that
accounts for probability of attack), either per e ort expended to administer grants (e ciency), or
disregarding e ort (e ectiveness).

The outcome is residual economic productivity, measured by dollars (line item), or by residual
network functionality per grant administration e ort, or without regard to e ort (e ciency vs
e ectiveness).

Analysis
Aggregatibility/Severability
Here, aggregatibility/severability of metrics also gets into network e ects, but in terms of “cascading
economic e ects” on networks of infrastructure, as explored in Taquechel (2013). In other words, the
aggregatibility focuses on the network e ects of consequence rather than the network e ects of
vulnerability or exploitation susceptibility. We can call this “failure susceptibility” in consequence
terms.

Network E ects- C Reduction (Resilience)
We now show a modi cation to the Figure 6 logic model. This incorporates ideas from network theory
with a consequence focus. Taquechel (2013) introduced the term “inherited failure susceptibility,”
proxied by CIKR network node degree, meaning the number of upstream suppliers a CIKR has in a
supply chain. When considered in tandem with a CIKR’s organic failure susceptibility, e.g. lack of
reserve raw product onsite to resume production after a disruption, inherited failure susceptibility
may exacerbate overall network failure susceptibility.
To set context for the updated logic model, we introduce an “expected network consequence” term:

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Risk-Based_Performance_Metrics_Eq8.png)
Eq. 8. Expected consequence of lth supply chain network with i nodes
This term accounts for the organic failure susceptibility of all nodes in a supply chain network. The
organic failure susceptibility is modeled as an exponential relationship between resilience e ort
actually invested and investment needed to minimize failure susceptibility. This susceptibility modi es

probabilistically the maximum possible economic loss to an ith node Coni(max). The expected
consequence to each node sums to the total expected network consequence.
If resilience activities covered in the logic model only improve resilience at some of the network
nodes, they may reduce overall network failure susceptibility and economic loss, but the
interdependencies between network nodes, proxied by node degree g, may increase potential loss.
That said, we want to expand our depiction of network expected consequence, as a function of
resilience investments at the supplier nodes, here with maximum consequence Cons(max).

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Risk-Based_Performance_Metrics_Eq9.png)
Eq. 9. Expected consequence to lth supply chain network, expanded to show supplier-node failure
probabilities
If we invest to increase the probability of rebuilding after a disruption, the Asreb term will increase,
thus increasing economic productivity.
Next, we introduce a term for risk to a network, that factors in network expected consequence:

Eq. 10. Conditional risk to lth supply chain network
The risk to a supply chain network is thus a function of network expected consequence, but also of an
attacker’s capability to attack supplier node s, and that node’s vulnerability to attack. Therefore, an
e ciency metric would be conditional network risk reduced or avoided, as a function of possible
economic loss reduced, per e ort to ensure such loss reduction. This term can capture the expanded
form of expected consequence shown in Equation 9, to allow simulation of resilience investments that
would lower conditional risk, retaining economic productivity. This retained economic productivity can
be expressed as a resilience term, the di erence between maximum pre-disruption economic output,
and conditional risk (expected economic loss) resulting from a disruption:

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Risk-Based_Performance_Metrics_Eq11.png)
Eq. 11. Resilience of lth supply chain, given e orts to reduce expected economic loss
Therefore, we can now show our modi cation to Figure 6:

(https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2018/12/Risk-Based_Performance_Metrics_ gure7.1.png)
Figure 7. Logic model, resilience activities (consequence reduction) – NETWORK EFFECTS
Key:
= expected supply chain economic loss theoretically avoided (by resilience activities)

= supply chain lost productivity avoided given resilience activities, accounting

for probability of attack, divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)

= supply chain lost productivity avoided, irrespective of resource inputs

= residual supply chain economic productivity (after resilience activities executed)

= residual supply chain productivity, accounting for probability of

attack, divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)

= residual supply chain productivity, irrespective of resource
inputs

Tracking Expenditures – Issues Speci c to Creducing Activities
As with vulnerability-reduction e orts, the inputs to achieve consequence reduction, if applied only at
certain infrastructure in a network, must be considered relative to the proportional e ect of those
reduction e orts. More speci cally, if port security grants increase resilience by lowering expected
economic loss at supplier nodes (for example, in a port), but the supply-chain network is composed of
downstream nodes with high organic failure susceptibility, the e orts to increase port facility
resilience may have a minimal e ect on overall supply chain resilience. If much e ort is expended to
administer port security grants, that may not be an ideal return on investment. However, e ciency
metrics may not be the prevailing budgetary theory preference.
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